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Abstract—The exchange of confidential messages is an inherent
problem in wireless communication due to the broadcast nature
of the radio channel. In this paper, we enhance standard cryptog-
raphy with information-theoretic techniques by exploiting relays
to increase the confidentiality of wireless communication in the
presence of one or more eavesdroppers with low-noise receivers.
To achieve this, we present a protocol which makes use of relays
in two ways. First, the relays re-transmit disjoint encrypted
chunks of a message. Second, the relays utilize cooperative
jamming techniques to generate pseudo-random signals in order
to increase the interference level in the propagation domain.
Chunks and interference levels are allocated over relays in such
a way that the message can only be decoded within a critical
area around the intended receiver. Our simulation results show
that this area can be minimized under realistic assumptions on
propagation environment and channel knowledge.
Index Terms—Relays; Interference; Security.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a world that is increasingly relying on wireless technolo-
gies, the need for secure communication through this medium
is becoming paramount. Achieving this is considerably more
challenging than in the wired setting, since information is
naturally broadcast rather than sent through the wire, and it
is generally considered easier for an attacker (A) to access
wireless network communications than wired ones.
Message confidentiality is a fundamental aspect of se-
cure communication and it is typically achieved by means
of encryption, which ensures that no information about the
encrypted message can be obtained without the appropriate
decryption key. Although in theory there are many provably
secure encryption schemes proposed in the cryptographic
literature (RSA [1] being the most prominent), practice shows
that unexpected vulnerabilities, such as the ones due to side-
channels (as pioneered by [2]) and introduced through imple-
mentation (for instance, [3]), lead to a breach of confidentiality.
While, on the one side, we have that the traditional way to pro-
vide security (i.e., cryptography) suffers from some practical
shortcomings, on the other we have that an emerging approach,
i.e., physical-layer security, is advancing in a promising way.
The concept of wiretap channel was introduced in [4],
in which it was proved that messages can achieve perfect
secrecy even in the absence of cryptographic protection, if the
transmission rate is smaller than the secrecy capacity (SC).
In [5], the SC of Gaussian channels was shown to amount to
the difference of the capacities of the intended receiver (IR)
and the A’s channels. In practical terms, this means that to
physically ensure the secrecy of a message it is sufficient to
guarantee that the SINR level of any malicious transmission,
i.e., the SINR of the message received by an A, is below
a certain threshold. These results have originated a series of
works and schemes that exploit the natural limitation of the
physical medium to increase the secrecy of a message. In
this line of research, works such as [6]–[9] aim, in general,
at improving the SINR of the communication towards the
intended receiver (IR), and reducing it towards the As.
As highlighted in [7], seeking solutions that combine the
two approaches, i.e., cryptography and information theory, to
improve the security of wireless communication is an inter-
esting and challenging area of research. Our work represents
a novel method in this direction.
A. Problem
In this paper, we consider the following problem: a base
station (BS) wishes to confidentially communicate a message
m to an IR over an open wireless channel. Contrary to standard
systems, the message will not be sent directly from the BS
to the IR; rather it will be transmitted via a set of available
communication relays. (Indeed, the use of relays in wireless
communication is rapidly increasing in order to better exploit
radio spectrum1.) Our goal is to ensure message confidentiality
in the presence of an attacker A that wants to eavesdrop the
communication. A can be located anywhere, and its location
is unknown to both the BS and the relays. Furthermore, we
allow A to be equipped with multiple antennas, as well as
its level of receive noise to be equal to zero, as the worst
case scenario. Note that our setting includes the case where
multiple As are active, including malicious relays attempting
to break message confidentiality.
B. Contributions
To solve this problem, we first introduce the concept of crit-
ical area (CA). The CA is an area situated in a neighborhood
of the IR in which the secret capacity of the message is high
enough to decode the transmitted message. In order to control
the dimension of the CA we exploit the presence of relays and
the concept of cooperative jamming [6]. Then, we propose
a novel method to distribute the message over a selected
subset of relays such that it can only be recovered in the
1Note that in 5G networks, also standard user equipment can be exploited
as relay thanks to device-to-device (D2D) technologies [10].
CA. More specifically, we propose to 1) separate the message
into chunks of bits which encode a subset of the message, 2)
estimate the average channel gain between a set of potential
relays and the IR, computing this estimation based on any
available information, such as channel statistical knowledge or
radio maps, 3) allocate the chunks to a set of relays, denoted
signal-relays, selected in order to obtain a sufficiently small
CA in which all of the chunks can be received at a signal
strength above their decoding threshold, and 4) choose a set
of relays, denoted interference-relays, to generate interference
to guarantee the size and shape of the CA for an arbitrarily
good receiver.
Our contributions are as follows. We propose and detail a
wireless communication protocol that instructs us to encode
a message m into several chunks, and to select a set of
signal-relays, to which the chunks are distributed, and a set
of interference-relays, which generate controlled noise. We
present several set-selection policies, which differ according
to various possible constraints, e.g., limit on the number of
usable relays or restriction on the size of the CA. We propose
cryptographic solutions to guarantee the confidentiality of the
message in the presence of an attacker A. We test the proposed
protocol through numerical simulations, confirming its capac-
ity to reduce the CA even for a zero-noise A. The proposed
protocol is a cross-layer solution that could be attractive in
the following use-cases: (a) a cryptographic key needs to be
established or renewed after a security leakage, (b) standard
cryptographic techniques are too computationally cumbersome
for an IR with limited computational capabilities, (c) a safety
net for encrypted transmission needs to be established due to
the importance of the message.
C. Related Work
Our work makes use of cooperative relays to enhance the
security of wireless communication. This idea has been studied
before. The interested reader can find in [7] an overview
of the state of the art in this domain. In particular, in
[9], the authors consider three schemes for secure message
transmission using cooperative relays – decode-and-forward,
amplify-and-forward, and cooperative jamming –, and for each
scheme they propose a system design (which includes power
allocation) for secrecy rate maximization. Their results assume
that global channel state information (CSI) is available and,
more importantly, that the eavesdropper’s channel is known.
Such strong assumptions reduce the practical viability of their
solution. By contrast, our work only assumes an average CSI
estimation and, more importantly, makes no assumption on
the knowledge of the adversary’s channel. In [11], wireless
security is enhanced by adopting particular MIMO precoding
techniques such as maximum ratio transmission and regu-
larized zero-forcing. It is argued that with infinite antennas
and perfect CSI, such system can delivered perfect security.
However, imperfect CSI and pilot contamination [12] can
completely compromise the secrecy of a message and this is
almost impossible to detect. In [13], the security in cognitive
radio systems using single and multiple relays is considered. In
particular, the authors propose a multi-relay selection scheme,
where each relay transmits the same message with different
levels of power reducing the energy consumption and the area
in which the message can be successfully decoded. We note
however that it suffices for an eavesdropper to be sufficiently
close to only one relay in order to decode the entire message.
Our solution does not suffer from this drawback, since an
A needs to recover all the message chunks distributed over
the multiple relays in order to recover the original message.
Finally, [6] proposes a cooperative transmission method which
divides the message into blocks, and distributes each block
to a different relay, similarly to what we do. The method’s
limitations mainly lie on the following assumptions: (a) A’s
hardware is identical to the IR’s (same noise level and number
of antennas); (b) the relays have perfect instantaneous channel
information; (c) the relays must be all trusted. Conversely, our
approach allows to relax all these assumptions.
II. NETWORK MODEL
Consider a wireless system in which a BS wishes to transmit
a messagem to an IR, avoiding one or more As, as represented
in Fig. 1. The BS is assumed to be aware of the position
of the IR and the relays it communicates with, however it
is unaware of the presence and the position of the eventual
As. Denote as p = (x, y) an arbitrary position on the map
containing the BS, the IR, the relays and the As. Assume that
a message is transmitted by a source with power PT . Denote
also by PR(r) the power received by a receiver r at position
p. In the presence of interference, and assuming the absence
of any form of interference cancellation, the capacity of the
transmission from a relay T to a receiver r is given by:
CT (r) =
1
2
log2
(
1 +
PR (r)
σ2r + I(r)
)
(1)
where σ2r represents the thermal noise of receiver r and I(r)
the sum of all the interference received at receiver r. Under this
conditions, it can be shown [5], [6], that the secrecy capacity
can be expressed as:
CSec = max{CT (IR)− CT (A), 0}. (2)
It is easy to show that all the As for which it results that
PR(IR)
σ2
IR
+ I(IR)
<
PR(A)
σ2
A
+ I(A)
(3)
have zero secrecy capacity and cannot reliably decode the
transmitted message if the transmission speed R is set suf-
ficiently close to R = WCT (r) [6].
This means that, for a fixed transmission rate R and
bandwidth W for the transmission to the IR, it is possible
to define a decoding threshold, denoted by Γ as the minimum
value of
PR(r)
I(r)+σ2 for which an A can eavesdrop the message,
i.e., Γ = 2
R
W
−1. The name decoding threshold is justified by
the fact that if a receiver has an SINR below such threshold
it cannot decode the message with 0 probability of error,
even if no cryptography is adopted, no matter what decoding
technique it adopts.
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Fig. 1. Basic scenario depicting the BS, the relays, the IR, and the As.
The value of the power received by a receiver r, i.e, PR(r),
depends on many factors such as distance from the transmitter,
presence of objects between the transmitter and the receiver,
fading and antenna gain. In the following, we refer to the
ratio between the transmit power PT and the received power
PR(r) as the channel gain GR(r) =
PT
PR(r)
. Note that, if the
BS had beforehand (a) the value of GR(r) for each point in
space and each receiver; (b) the value of the thermal noise
power for each receiver σ2r ; and (c) the level of power of the
interference received I(r), then it could establish where, and
which receiver, is able to decode the message.
A. Channel Gain Estimation
The channel between the IR and the available relays is
supposed known (or estimated up to some uncertainty) by the
BS. In order to estimate such a value, a channel estimation
scheme can used, in particular in TDD systems where the
training sequences transmitted by the IR are exploited by
the relays to estimate the channel gains. This would yield
almost perfect instantaneous channel knowledge at the cost
of high signaling between the relays and the BS. A more
practical approach would encompass the adoption of statistical
channel knowledge or of radio maps. In particular, radio maps
are a viable way to achieve a sufficiently precise and cheap
estimation of the channel gain. Radio maps report for every
point in the cell, and every transmitter, the average channel
gain. This information is measured once and then updated
when new measures are available [14].
III. WIRELESS COMMUNICATION PROTOCOL
We propose a wireless communication protocol which
makes use of cooperative relays. The main idea behind our
protocol is as follows. First, split the original message into
smaller chunks with no redundancy, i.e., all the chunks are
necessary to recover the original message m. Second, assign
each chunk to a different relay in such a way that the area
in which it is possible to correctly decode all the chunks
(denoted as critical area (CA)) is centered around the IR and
is sufficiently small. Third, in order to prevent an arbitrarily
powerful A to see an increased CA, select a number of relays
to transmit a pseudo-random noise of controlled power.
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Fig. 2. Interactions between the entities in the system. Here, it is highlighted
the role of the interference-relays.
Our protocol can be considered a wireless communication
framework, and can be schematized as follows.
• Setup phase
The BS first locates the IR and the available relays. It then
selects two sets RS and RI of relays: RS are the signal-relays
for message transmission and RI are the interference-relays
for noise generation. Such selection is based on criteria such
as those detailed in Section III-A.
• Transmit phase
Message transmission: The BS separates message m into
chunks which are distributed to the signal-relays in RS . It
also transmits values for interference to relays in RI .
Interference Generation: While the signal-relays simply for-
ward the chunks to the IR, as per standard relay, interference-
relays in RI , equipped with an interference generator, emit
a pseudo-random sequence emulating Gaussian noise, which
creates an artificial noise floor in accordance with the BS’s
instructions. The interference generated to the IR from the
interference-relay is henceforth denoted as I¯IR.
• Receive phase
The IR retrieves all the chunks to recover the message.
The key interactions between the entities in our protocol are
depicted in Fig. 2. We next provide details to illustrate how
to implement our protocol in practice.
A. Setup Phase
- Position retrieval
At first, the BS needs to retrieve the position of the IR and the
relays. Some relays are infrastructure relays, and their position
is known a priori. Consider, however, that in LTE-A and 5G
even mobile devices can be used by the BS as a potential relay.
In this case their position needs to be acquired. The position
of the IR can also be determined by means of GPS or similar
location sensors and signaled to the BS by the device.
- Relay discard
The BS has now a list of available relays in the area of
interest of the BS. However, this list can be cumbersome,
especially if D2D relaying is admitted. In order to reduce the
list dimension, it is possible to discard the relays that do not
respect a minimal set of features. Instances of such features
are: minimum transmit power, available battery, proximity to
known malicious users.
- Relay ranking
The relays now present in the list are ranked from the one
requiring the least amount of power to the one requiring the
most amount of power to transmit to the IR. The amount of
power is estimated through standard transmission techniques
or by means of link budget based on a known path-loss
measurement, e.g., present in a radio map.
- Area drawing
In this step, the BS computes for each relay the area in which
the respective chunk can be decoded. This area can be drawn
using two different proposed approaches: geometrical (GB)
and radio-map-based (RMB). The GB method requires the
BS to compute the maximal receiver radius within which
the message can be detected. This can be obtained from
conventional path-loss equations and channel modeling. A
circle of equal radius is hence drawn around each relay.
Conversely the RMB approach requires the BS to use image
processing techniques on top of the radio map in order to
estimate the channel gain between the relays and each point
of the map.
- Relay Selection
Relay set RS . In order to select the signal-relays we propose
three different strategies. In the first one, the BS fixes a number
number of relays and an exhaustive search is run through the
relays in order to minimize the critical area. The purpose is to
minimize the geographical zones in which an A can decode
all the messages for a given amount of network resource.
In a second strategy, the BS fixes a threshold area and
an exhaustive search algorithm is run in order to minimize
the number of relays used. Here, the purpose is to minimize
the relay usage (and corresponding resource exploitation)
guaranteeing that the critical area is below a given threshold.
In a third strategy, the BS fixes a threshold area, and the
relays are ranked from the one with the highest channel gain
to the one with the lowest channel gain with respect to the IR.
Then the BS starts from the first relay in the list, and it adds
relays until the critical area falls below the fixed threshold.
The purpose is to adopt a minimum amount of power in order
to achieve a target CA.
Relay set RI . The interference creating relays are selected
as follows. First, a total interference factor IR is established.
This is the largest interference level that can be created to
the IR, and that will need to be compensated by the power
at the signal transmitting relays. As a rule of thumb, one can
take IR = σ2r , that is a degradation of 3 dB of SINR for the
IR. Relays are thus ranked from the one showing the smallest
channel gain to the one with the largest channel gain towards
the IR, and are added to the list correspondingly computing
the level of total interference created to the IR, until the total
interference reaches the threshold IR.
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Fig. 3. We depict here a simple run of our protocol. It is designed so that only
the IR receives both chunks, namely r and m⊕ r, from which the message
m can be recovered. Either chunk alone leaks nothing about m, ensuring
confidentiality of the message.
B. Transmit Phase
- Message transmission
Let m be the message BS wishes to deliver to the IR. Let
us assume that the message space consists of bit-strings of
length n, i.e., m ∈ {0, 1}n. If that is not the case, we can
find a mapping from the message space to bit-strings of a
fixed length. Let ℓ be the number of relays in RS selected in
the Setup phase. The core idea is to split the message into ℓ
chunks such that 1) BS distributes one chunk per relay and
2) all chunks are needed to recover message m. The choice
of relays in our proposed protocol ensures that the recovery
of all ℓ chunks is only possible if a user is in the critical
area. If such area surrounds the IR and is small enough, we
are guaranteed that only the IR recovers all the chunks. We
note that message m represents the information BS wishes to
confidentially communicate to IR. We do not limit its nature,
i.e., it could be raw content as well as cryptographic key
material exchanged for further purposes.
We propose to deliver message m in the following way.
BS generates ℓ − 1 random bit-strings of length n, namely
r1, r2, . . . , rℓ−1. It then computes rℓ = m⊕r1⊕r2⊕· · ·⊕rℓ−1
and, for all i from 1 to ℓ, sends ri to relay Ri ∈ RS . Each
relay transmits the received chunk to the IR.
- Interference Generation
As can be easily deduced from (3) the critical area dimension
strongly depends on the variance of the noise σ2r . If an A
is equipped with particularly sophisticated hardware, it can
be subject to a reduced level of noise and hence observe an
increased CA [15]. In this step, the interference-relays attempt
to reduce the critical area against an A equipped with a zero-
noise receiver. This is done by creating a certain level of
fictional interference that behaves as additive noise for all the
receivers. In principle, this disturbs in a controlled way also the
reception of the IR. However, since the noise is controlled, its
negative effect can be compensated by a higher transmission
power. For A, on the other hand, the extra interference will
drastically reduce the reception capability.
C. Receive Phase
The IR computes r1⊕ r2⊕ · · ·⊕ rℓ−1⊕ rℓ and recovers the
message. Note that only by receiving all r1, r2, . . . , rℓ−1, rℓ
can the message m be reconstructed. A simplified instance of
this phase is depicted in Fig.3.
IV. PROTOCOL ANALYSIS
In this section, we present an analysis of our protocol. More
specifically, we first provide measurements for its performance
in terms of the dimension of the CA, showcasing the value
of a higher number of signal-relays as well as the need for
interference-relays to guarantee that the CA remains suffi-
ciently small. We then discuss the security of our protocol
in the presence of an eavesdropper, and suggest possible
extensions to account for more powerful, i.e. active, attackers.
A. Simulations
We consider a simple example of a rectangular cell of sides
equal to 200m and 300m. The IR is set at the center of the
cell, whereas 40 relays are randomly positioned inside the
borders. For simplicity, perfect CSI information between each
relay and the IR is assumed, and an exponential model of
exponent α = 2 is considered. All the devices in the network
are assumed to be equipped with an isotropic single-antenna,
hence the antenna gains are normalized at one. Each relay has
a maximum transmit power of 23 dBm, the IR and A noise
variances are set to σ2IR = −90 dBm and σ
2
A = 120 dBm,
respectively. It is assumed that each message can be correctly
decoded if the SINR level is above a threshold Γ = 10 dB.
The protocol implemented in the simulation operates as
follows. First, a fixed predefined number of signal-relays are
selected starting from the closest to the IR to the farthest.
Each of these relays is assigned a transmission power equal
to the minimum necessary power to respect the SINR threshold
condition at the IR position, that is
PT =
σ2IR + I¯IR
GIR
10
Γ
10 . (4)
Note that, under the simplified channel model considered
in this experiment, this policy also minimizes the power
consumed by the relays. Second, the interference-relays are
selected going from the farthest to the closest to the IR. Each
relay is assigned its maximum transmit power, and relays are
added to the list as long as (i) the interference generated to the
IR is below the interference threshold IIR, and (ii) there are
available relays that are not already selected as signal-relays.
Monte Carlo simulations are run in order to average among
the different possible relay positions. The results of this
experiment are reported in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5. Fig. 4 plots the
ratio between the CA and the total cell area corresponding to
IR’s noise level, as a function of the amount of signal-relays.
We remark the following.
Remark 1: The dimension of the CA strongly decreases as
the number of selected signal-relays increases. This is due to
the fact that the CA is the intersection among all the areas in
which the single chunks are received with a sufficient SINR.
Remark 2: The correct number of selected signal-relays
depends on the precision of the estimated average CSI and
the desired CA dimension. In more realistic settings, it is not
possible to exploit perfect CSI, hence a certain tolerance on
the dimension of the CA should be accounted for.
Fig. 5 plots the dimension of the ratio between the CA and
the total cell area corresponding to the A’s noise level, as a
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Remark 3: From Fig. 5 we see that increasing the number
of signal-relays does not reduce efficiently the CA from A’s
point of view. This demonstrates that policies based only on
distributing the message among different relays are unable to
guarantee the privacy of a message.
Remark 4: The level of interference generated to the IR
strongly impacts the A’s ability to eavesdrop a message. How-
ever one should consider that the interference also deteriorates
the performance of the IR, and needs to be compensated by a
higher transmission power as indicated in (4). Moreover, such
a technique potentially deteriorates the performance of other
receivers present in the same cell. As a consequence, too high
levels of interference are undesirable. As a rule of thumb,
a level of I¯IR = σ2IR appears as a good tradeoff between
security and performance.
B. Security analysis and extensions
Since receiving all the chunks can only happen inside the
critical area, our protocol provides message confidentiality
against passive attacks, i.e., eavesdropping, whenever the
adversary is outside of the critical area. Furthermore, the
adversary recovers no partial information on the message even
if it recovers some of the chunks. In particular, r1, r2,. . . ,
rℓ−1 are random bit-strings and therefore do not contain any
information onm, and rℓ is a one-time pad form and therefore
information-theoretically hides the message. So, as long as
we can ensure a sufficiently small CA, our protocol provides
confidentiality to wireless communication.
We can envisage to enhance the security of our protocol by
considering the following extensions.
Let Π be a public-key encryption scheme consisting of algo-
rithms GenKey, Enc and Dec, as per standard definition [16].
Let each possible receiver IR be equipped with a public key pk
and a corresponding secret key sk, obtained by running Π‘s
key generation algorithm GenKey. Let BS split the message
m into chunks as in Section III-B. Further, for all i from 1 to ℓ,
let BS encrypt ri with pk, and send ci = Enc(pk, ri) to relay
Ri. Each relay transmits the received ciphertext to the IR, who
runs Dec using sk on each received ciphertext and reconstructs
the message. Note that only the IR can decrypt using sk,
and message m can be reconstructed only upon receiving
all ciphertexts encrypting the ris. By adding encryption, we
strengthen the security of our protocol against passive attacks
to hold end-to-end (as opposed to just outside the critical
area). This means that even if the eavesdropper receives all
the encrypted chunks, i.e., the adversary is in the critical area,
it cannot recoverm since it does not hold the secret key needed
for decryption.
Let Σ be a digital signature scheme consisting of algorithms
Gen, Sign and Ver, as per standard definition [16]. Let
(sigk, vk) be, respectively, the signature and verification keys
BS is equipped with by running Gen. This method is as
above where additionally BS signs each ciphertext with sigk
before distributing them to the relays, which forward each
received signed ciphertext to the IR. The IR first verifies with
the verification key vk each ciphertext it receives from the
relays, and then, if all verifications succeed, decrypts and re-
computes the message as usual. By adding a signature to the
sent encrypted chunks we provide message authentication, i.e.,
the IR is guaranteed that, if the signature verifies, the signed
material originates from the BS. This addition is a security
enhancement since the resulting protocol resists passive attacks
and a class of active attacks, namely pollution attacks. Indeed,
failure of a signature to verify allows the IR to detect that the
attacker has injected a malicious packet so as to prevent the
IR from reconstructing the correct message.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This papers proposes a method to increase the confidential-
ity of wireless communication between a base station and a
receiver, when multiple attackers with unknown positions are
present in the network. The main idea is to exploit cooperative
transmission via signal-relays to create an exclusive geograph-
ical zone, denoted critical area (CA), in which the message can
be correctly decoded. However, the dimension of such zone is
shown to be dependent on the noise floor at the receiver. To
guarantee that the size of the CA remains sufficiently small,
even in the presence of attackers equipped with enhanced
hardware (at the limit with noiseless receivers), a selected
set of interference-relays appropriately transmits a pseudo-
random noise. Different relay-selection policies are proposed,
and numerical simulations show that, if perfect channel state
information (CSI) is available, it is possible to arbitrarily
reduce the dimension of the CA. It is argued that, when only
imperfect statistical CSI is available, a certain tolerance in the
dimension of the CA has to be accounted for. This reduces
the secrecy level with respect to the case with perfect CSI, but
does not compromise it. A specific cryptographic technique,
tailored for creating different enciphered chunks, is argued to
protect the confidentiality of the message in the presence of
passive as well as active attackers.
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